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FAMILY LAW
Allison Anna Tait *
Another year of family law activity in Virginia brought both new
legislation, which will likely have long-term impacts, as well as a
new set of judicial opinions that will bring changes to the Virginia
rules. The terrain covered in the legislation and opinions varies,
but it includes certain fixtures such as marriage and divorce re-
quirements, equitable distribution, spousal and child support, and
child custody. This brief overview addresses all these areas, begin-
ning with the legislative changes and then moving to the courts.
I. IN THE LEGISLATURE
The legislature passed particularly important pieces of legisla-
tion this year regarding divorce and life insurance. What the legis-
lature failed to pass and what was vetoed, however, are of interest
as well.
A. ABLE Accounts
In the child support arena, the legislature amended Virginia
Code sections 16.278.15(A) and 20-124.2(C) to provide that a court
may order support payments be made to an Achieving a Better Life
Experience ("ABLE") savings trust account.' ABLE accounts are
tax-advantaged savings accounts for eligible individuals with dis-
abilities, which act in a number of ways like a special needs trust.2
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to the Univer-
sity of Richmond Law Review and Brian Melnyk for inviting me to write this overview and
to the staff for their excellent editorial work.
1. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 95, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-278.15(C) (Cum. Supp. 2017); id. § 20-124.2(C) (Supp. 2017)).
2. David A. Rephan & Joelle Groshek, ABLE Act Accounts: Achieving a Better Life
Experience for Individuals with Disabilities with Tax-Preferred Savings (and the Old Relia-
ble Special and Supplemental Needs Trusts), 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 963, 974, 976
(2016).
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B. Life Insurance
The most significant family law legislation of the year was un-
doubtedly the enactment of a new law permitting courts to order
one party to a divorce to maintain life insurance with the other
party as the designated beneficiary.3 This new Code provision ef-
fectively overrules Lapidus v. Lapidus, which held that nothing in
the domestic relations code empowered Virginia courts to order
that a party maintain or contract for life insurance policies for the
benefit of the other party.4
The new law (Virginia Code section 20-107.1:1), which went into
effect July 1, 2017, states that a court has the ability to decree that
one spouse maintain his or her life insurance policy with the other
spouse as beneficiary if the policy "was purchased during the mar-
riage, is issued through the insured's employment, or is within ef-
fective control of the insured."5 A court still does not have the stat-
utory authority to order a party to obtain a new life insurance
policy for the benefit of the other spouse. In addition, the party or-
dered to maintain the policy must have the right to designate a
beneficiary and the other spouse must have been designated as a
beneficiary of the policy during the marriage and must be a party
with an insurable interest.6 The court may order the payee spouse
to be designated as beneficiary of "all or a portion" of the life insur-
ance policy.7 The court may also allocate the premium cost of the
life insurance between the parties, provided that all premiums are
billed to the policyholder and order the insured party to execute all
appropriate forms and written consents.8 Any such requirement
imposed by the court, however, ends on the termination of the "ob-
ligation to pay spousal support."9
In making such an order, there are a number of factors that the
court must consider. These factors include the age and health of
both parties, the cost of the policy and prevailing insurance rates,
3. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, ch. 797, 2017 Va. Acts _,__ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.1:1(A) (Supp. 2017)).
4. 266 Va. 575, 579, 311 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1984).
5. Ch. 797, 2017 Va. Acts ; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1:1(A) (Supp. 2017).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1:1(A) (Supp. 2017). See id. § 38.2-301(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014)
("Insurable interest" is defined as, "[i]n the case of individuals related closely by blood or by
law, a substantial interest engendered by love and affection.").





the amount and duration of the support order, and the ability of
either spouse to pay the premium cost of the life insurance.0 Any
order to maintain life insurance may be modified by either party if
there is a material change in circumstances.' Such a change might
include the remarriage of the party maintaining the policy.1 2 The
enactment of this new law demonstrates the Commonwealth's
commitment to providing financial protection for an ex-spouse who
is receiving spousal support in the event of the payor spouse's
death and to the continued privatization of family support.
C. Enacted But Vetoed
The Governor vetoed a bill-passed by both houses of the legis-
lature-which provided:
[N]o person (individual, religious organization, clerk or clergy member
and others) shall be required to participate in the solemnization of any
marriage or be subject to any penalty, tax, tax disallowance or other
monetary penalties listed, solely on account of such person's belief,
speech or action in accordance "with a sincerely held religious or moral
conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one
man and one woman."13
The bill was a clear attempt to circumvent the administration and
implementation of the Supreme Court's mandate of same-sex mar-
riage, as set forth in Obergefell v. Hodges.'4
D. Bill That Failed
In a similar push against the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,15
another bill which would have repealed Virginia's prohibitions
against same-sex marriage and civil unions16 failed to be reported
10. See id. § 20-107.1:1(B) (Supp. 2017).
11. Id. § 20-107.1:1(A), (C) (Supp. 2017).
12. Id. § 20-107.1:1(C) (Supp. 2017). However, "[t]his provision shall not permit the
change in marital status of the payor spouse to be considered as a factor under § 20-107.1 or
considered a material change in circumstances in any proceeding related to the modification
of spousal support." Id.
13. Lawrence D. Diehl, Legislative Update: 2017 General Assembly Session, 37 VA. FAM.
L.Q. 5, 7, 15 (2017) (quoting H.B. 2025, Va. Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 2017)).
14. 576 U.S._ _, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding the Constitution guarantees
the fundamental right to marriage to same-sex couples and heterosexual couples, alike); see
e.g., Miller v. Davis, No. CV 15-44-DLB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113637, at *44-45 (E.D. Ky.
July 21, 2017) (ordering Kentucky to pay fees on behalf of Kim Davis).
15. 576 U.S. at _, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
16. See H.B. 1395, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2017) (repealing VA. CODE ANN. §§
2017] 57
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out by its committee.17 This bill would have brought Virginia law
into alignment with the Obergefell ruling and demonstrated a com-
mitment not only to marriage equality, but also to LGBTQ rights
more generally.
II. IN THE COURTS
In the last year, Virginia courts put forth opinions concerning all
parts of marriage-from entry to exit, providing interesting fodder
for analysis and, in some cases, righting some wrongs in lower
court opinions.
A. Grounds for Terminating a Marriage
One case that reappeared last year-as the result of an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Virginia-is MacDougall v. Levick,'s
which offered an especially technocratic and inequitable opinion by
the appellate court last time around. The central issue in the case
was that the couple in question had solemnized their marriage
without properly acquiring a marriage license.'9 The couple partic-
ipated in a traditional marriage ceremony officiated by a rabbi;
however, they failed to obtain a license in the midst of moving and
planning the wedding.20 When the couple realized the mistake,
they obtained a license after the fact, sent it to the rabbi for his
signature, and then went about the business of being married.21
Over a decade later, when the couple began divorce proceedings,
the husband sought to avoid equitable distribution or spousal sup-
port by contending that the marriage was void ab initio.22 The trial
court agreed with this contention.23 The appellate court disagreed
and concluded that the marriage was, rather, voidable.24 Neverthe-
less, even though the court concluded that the marriage was void-
able instead of void ab initio, the court declined to equitably divide
20-45.2 to -45.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016)).
17. HB 1395 Same-sex Marriages; Civil Unions, VA.'S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.vir
ginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=171&typ=bil&val=hbl395 (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
18. 66 Va. App. 50, 782 S.E.2d 182 (2016).
19. Id. at 58-59, 782 S.E.2d at 186.
20. Id. at 58-59, 782 S.E.2d at 186.
21. Id. at 58-59, 782 S.E.2d at 186.
22. See id. at 59-60, 782 S.E.2d at 187.
23. Id. at 60, 782 S.E.2d at 187.
24. Id. at 75, 782 S.E.2d at 194.
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property or award any spousal support on the theory that the mar-
riage never existed.25
Making matters worse, the appellate court declined to deploy
any equitable doctrines to rectify the wife's situation. Equitable es-
toppel, the court remarked, did not apply: "[The wife] urges us to
adopt the concept of marriage by estoppel. We must decline the in-
vitation. The legislature is the rightful branch of government to set
Virginia's public policy with regard to an institution so founda-
tional, and of such paramount importance to society, as mar-
riage."26
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, however, the court
settled the definition and rights accompanying a voidable mar-
riage. The supreme court held that the appellate court erred in
holding that the marriage was voidable.27 Additionally, the su-
preme court held that even if the marriage had been voidable, the
appellate court erred in holding that the wife had no property or
support rights arising from a voidable marriage and in holding that
equitable estoppel was unavailable as a remedy as well.2 8 The court
also concluded that both statutory language and precedent com-
pelled the conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio.29 In the
wife's favor, the court concluded that the appellate court had erred
in affirming that the husband had not waived his right to contest
the parties' marital agreement.30 Finally, the court also concluded
(in agreement with the husband) that the court of appeals erred by
declaring non-compliant attempted unions to be voidable because
such a conclusion essentially approved a "form of common law mar-
riage, contrary to long-standing Virginia law and public policy." 31
25. Id. at 76, 782 S.E.2d at 195 ("Our conclusion that the parties were never married
means that MacDougall cannot obtain the distribution of marital property through equita-
ble distribution because no marital estate ever existed, and neither can she obtain post-
divorce spousal support, because in the eyes of the law she was never a spouse to Levick.").
26. Id. at 78, 782 S.E.2d at 196. The appellate court did partially uphold the marital
agreement, based on mistake of fact, and allowed the wife to keep the pendente lite pay-
ments she had received. Id. at 81, 782 S.E.2d at 197. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that it had been mistake of law. MacDougall v. Levick, No. 160551, 2016 Va. LEXIS 204, at
*1 (Dec. 27, 2016).
27. MacDougall, 2016 Va. LEXIS 204, at *1.
28. Id. at *1-2.
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *3.
2017] FAMILY LAW 59
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The Supreme Court of Virginia consequently restored the rights
attendant to a voidable marriage as well as the right to claim eq-
uitable estoppel in such a situation. In addition, the court restored
a distinction between void and voidable that hewed to both statu-
tory language and precedential authority.
In another case about grounds for divorce, the court clarified
how abandonment and desertion work when a husband keeps tell-
ing his wife that she is overweight. In Mabe v. Mabe, the wife peti-
tioned for and was granted a divorce based on her husband's de-
sertion.32 The husband denied the allegations of desertion,
claiming it was constructive desertion.33 The husband appealed the
final divorce decree, claiming that the parties had "agreed that he
would leave the marital home after he finished his exams for the
spring" and that his wife told him "he could not return to the mar-
ital home because 'the marriage was over."'34 The wife, in her peti-
tion, told a different story. The wife claimed that her husband con-
tinually "belittled her about her weight and threatened to leave her
if she did not lose weight."35 She stated that she had not wanted
her husband to leave the home or the marriage.36
In weighing these differing accounts of marital breakdown, the
trial court found that the couple's marriage "had been in trouble
for many years."37 And one of the main sources of conflict was that
the wife was not able "to keep up" with her husband's demands
relating to her weight and "her performance in the bedroom."38 The
wife presented evidence that the husband "belittled" her for not
being able to meet his demands, while the husband testified that
the wife made the marriage "unbearable."39 Ultimately, while ad-
mitting that "tensions were high" between the parties, the court
concluded that the husband became frustrated and left the mar-
riage voluntarily.40 The appellate court agreed.41
32. No. 0007-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 185, at *2 (Ct. App. June 14, 2016) (un-
published decision).
33. Id. at *2 (noting that the "[h]usband sought a divorce based on cruelty and construc-
tive desertion").
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id. at *5.
40. Id. at *4-5.
41. Id. at *9.
60 [Vol. 52:55
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While the couple clearly stopped cohabiting, the intention of the
husband to desert the wife was not crystal clear. The court, how-
ever, found the wife's statements and evidence not only sympa-
thetic but also credible-credible enough to grant her divorce on
the grounds of abandonment and desertion.
B. Equitable Distribution
In the realm of equitable distribution, Virginia courts were quite
active and a number of interesting questions came before them.
These questions included ones about the valuation of family busi-
nesses, the division of special assets, and even fraud.
In Wagner v. Wagner, the court was asked to reopen a divorce
case from 1999 in which the wife had lied about the value and
whereabouts of a particular piece of artwork during the trial.42 In
2015, the husband tried to have the divorce order set aside on the
basis of fraud and the circuit court dismissed his action.43 In 2016,
the appellate court affirmed, after engaging in a useful discussion
about the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.44
The facts of the case: the couple went through divorce proceed-
ings in 1999, and during those proceedings there was a question
about the value of a painting owned by the couple.45 The wife tes-
tified under oath that she had given the painting away at a flea
market.46 The husband wanted to have an expert witness testify
about the value of the painting, but the expert was excluded due to
the husband's failure to designate the witness in a timely man-
ner.47 The judge, consequently, assigned a $2000 value to the
painting based on the cost incurred to restore it.48 That value was
used in the equitable distribution award and the final decree was
issued.49
Fast forward five years when the husband filed a complaint to
set aside the final divorce decree, alleging that during the divorce,
42. No. 1733-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 257, at *2-3 (Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2016) (un-
published decision).
43. Id. at *1-2.
44. Id. at *6-8, *14.
45. Id. at *1-2.
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the wife "hid the painting, lied about it during discovery, and com-
mitted perjury when she testified that she had given it away." 0
After a three-day hearing, the circuit court found that the wife had
not given away the painting but rather had hidden it during the
divorce, and that "her testimony at the divorce hearing, that she
did not have knowledge of the whereabouts of this asset and did
not have control of the whereabouts of this asset . .. [was] com-
pletely false."5 1 The court even remarked that the wife was "the
least credible witness in this case of all the witnesses."5 2
Nevertheless, the circuit court determined that the wife's actions
constituted intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud because those ac-
tions "did not prevent 'a fair submission' of the equitable distribu-
tion matter."53 Examples of extrinsic fraud, the court suggested,
included "a litigant's '[k]eeping the unsuccessful party away from
the court by a false promise of a compromise, . . . purposely keeping
him in ignorance of the suit; [and] . . . an attorney['s] fraudulently
pretend[ing] to represent a party[] and conniv[ing] at his defeat."'54
Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, included "perjury, forged docu-
ments, [and] other incidents of trial related to issues material to
the judgment."55 In essence, the court stated, intrinsic fraud was
"obscuring facts."5 6 The distinction was critical, the court further
observed, because intrinsic fraud is voidable by direct attack but
only until the judgment becomes final.57 Based on this definition,
the court affirmed the lower court's ruling, stating that the hus-
band failed to prove extrinsic fraud and therefore no longer had
any grounds for reopening the claim against his wife for fraud re-
lated to the equitable distribution of martial property.58
50. Id.
51. Id. at *2-3 (alterations in original).
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *4 (alterations in original).
54. Id. at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting McClung v. Folks, 126 Va. 259, 270, 101
S.E. 345, 348 (1919)).
55. Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Remley,
270 Va. 209, 218, 618 S.E.2d 316, 318 (2005)).
56. Id. at *7-8 (citing Peet v. Peet, 16 Va. App. 323, 326, 429 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1993)).
57. Id. at *7.
58. Id. at *8-9.
62 [Vol. 52:55
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Several other equitable distribution cases-including Pence v.
Pence,5 9 Hassell v. Hassell,60 and Allen v. Allen6 1-addressed ques-
tions concerning the valuation and distribution of business assets.
Pence v. Pence, for example, addressed the relationship between
marital fault and property distribution.
In Pence, the husband and wife married in 2001 and had three
children.62 Early in the marriage, the husband started a business,
Pence Quality Homes ("PQH"), building and renovating homes.63
In the early years of the business, the wife "assisted in some of the
office and bookkeeping responsibilities of PQH." 6 4 The couple ac-
quired properties for renovation and often utilized the acquired
property as the marital home during renovations.65 Moreover, the
wife used a trust fund that had been established for her benefit by
her grandparents to support real estate loans for the business.66
Around 2012, the wife began "expending increasingly large sums
on personal travel and recreation and detaching herself from in-
volvement in family and business affairs."67 The next year, the hus-
band confronted her about an affair she was having with her per-
sonal trainer, and in 2014, the couple separated.68 In 2015, the
court granted the husband's petition for a divorce on the ground of
his wife's adultery.69
The trial court, in dividing the marital property, gave the vast
majority of the business assets to the husband, finding that,
"[g]iven the overall contributions of [husband] to the business-he
was the face of the business . . . it is clear that [husband] contrib-
uted more personal equity, financial risk, and personal good will
than [wife] did to the endeavor."70 The trial court acknowledged the
59. Nos. 1567-15-4, 1591-15-4, 1813-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 275 (Ct. App. Oct. 18,
2016) (unpublished decision).
60. No. 0414-16-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 310 (Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016) (unpublished de-
cision).
61. No. 0562-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 54 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2017) (unpublished deci-
sion).
62. Pence, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 275, at *2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *2-3.
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *4 (alterations in original).
632017]
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wife's early contributions to the business, but stated that her hus-
band "more than matched" these contributions.7 1 In addition, the
court suggested that the "[wife] clearly became disenchanted with
her role as wife and mother and was enjoying spending 'quality
time' outside of the home" in the later years of the marriage.72
On appeal, the wife argued that the trial court erred in making
a disproportionate award in favor of the husband "while at the
same time finding that both he and [the] wife contributed to these
properties."73 The court was, the wife claimed, inappropriately and
punitively using fault as a factor in the equitable distribution when
her fault did not affect the marital finances or the operation of the
business.74 Reviewing the trial court's decision, the appellate court
noted the trial court's finding that the "wife curtailed her contribu-
tions to the family and home early in the marriage such that 'out-
side help' was needed for cooking, cleaning, and child care. Fur-
ther, by the time of their separation, what little efforts [the] wife
had contributed to managing the books for PQH had entirely
ceased."75 Consideration of the contributions of both parties was,
the appellate court stated, fair.76 Moreover, "while equitable distri-
bution is not a vehicle to punish behavior, the statutory guidelines
authorize consideration of [infidelity] as having an adverse effect
on the marriage and justifying an award that favors one spouse
over the other."7 7 The trial court's decidedly uneven awarding of
the business assets was, consequently, not an abuse of discretion.78
This result begs the question of whether any type of fault may con-
tribute to a radically unequal distribution of marital assets, even
if the fault was non-economic, and, if so, what the role of fault con-
siderations in spousal support is.
In Hassell v. Hassell, on the other hand, the trial court failed to
value a closely held business started by the husband and yet allo-
cated marital debt in a certain amount based on a certain assumed
company value.79 The couple was married in 1993 in New York
71. Id.
72. Id. at *3-4 (alteration in original).
73. Id. at *8-9.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *9-10.
76. Id. at *11.
77. Id. at *10 (alteration in original) (quoting O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 20 Va. App.
522, 527, 458 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1995)).
78. Id. at *11.
79. No. 0414-16-6, Va. App. LEXIS 310, at *14-16 (Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).
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and, prior to the marriage, the husband had founded Repton
Group, Inc., a company specializing in global finance.80 The hus-
band owned a little over ninety-seven percent of the business.81
The wife never worked directly for the business and had a job in
the pharmaceutical industry, where she earned a salary approxi-
mating $80,000.82 In 1994, however, she left her job when their
first son was born.83 Another son was born in 1997, and in 1998 the
family moved to Virginia from New York, although the husband
continued to manage his business in New York.84
During the marriage, the business was the family's main source
of income and it provided the family with "horses, overseas vaca-
tions, and private-school education and a nanny for the children."85
The husband, at a certain point, inherited $2.5 million from his
mother's estate.86 Nevertheless, by 2010, the couple was in finan-
cial distress and was forced to sell numerous assets, including a
Virginia farmhouse.87 By 2014, the marriage was on the rocks and
the wife filed a divorce petition.88
The court issued its ruling by letter in November 2015, finding
that the marital estate was composed of the couple's New York
apartment, three vehicles, and a 97.5% interest in Repton.89 In ad-
dition, the court valued each of these items, assigning a definite
dollar amount to each--except Repton.90 The court remarked that,
because the company was closely held, the value was difficult to
determine and that the court was to look to the "intrinsic value of





85. Id. at *3.
86. Id. (In 2008, the parties established a trust, the von Hassell Virginia Trust. "Re-
garding the husband's management of the trust, the trial court specifically found that '[t]o
sustain [his] lavish lifestyle over a sustained period of time, [h]usband expended approxi-
mately $1 million in funds that had been inherited from his mother's estate, but that [re-
maining proceeds from the inheritance] were transferred to a trust established for the ben-
efit and wellbeing of the parties' two sons."') (alterations in original).
87. Id. (explaining that "[e]-mails between the parties from 2011 show their discussions
regarding their financial status, including what to sell and how to pay for things such as
college tuition").
88. Id.
89. Id. at *4.
90. Id. at *5.
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the property to the parties to measure value for equitable distribu-
tion purposes."91 The court also mentioned the goodwill value of the
company and found that "'the intrinsic value of the business is in-
extricably linked with the [h]usband's professional bility,' so that
without him, 'its value is simply the fair market value of the busi-
ness assets . . . ."'92 So saying, the court did not attempt to value
either professional goodwill or the business assets. Even more sur-
prisingly, neither party attempted to present any expert testimony
about the value of the business.93 The court only determined that
the husband's interest in the company was marital property.94
Subsequently, the court allocated approximately $250,000 in
marital debt to the husband to compensate the wife for her share
in the business.95
Specifically, the trial court ruled, "Husband shall retain owner-
ship of the Repton Group in his sole name. To compensate Wife for
her interest in that entity, and for the [husband]'s mismanagement
and waste of marital resources, the [husband] shall retain full re-
sponsibility for and hold the [wife] harmless from the Marital
Debt."9 6 The court did not specify what part of the $249,000 was in
compensation for the wife's interest in the company and what part
was to compensate for the husband's financial mismanagement.
On appeal, the husband challenged this characterization of the
asset. However, the appellate court declined to address this objec-
tion because the husband first raised it on appeal.97 The appellate
court did, nevertheless, take up the issue of business valuation,
stating, "The failure or inability of a trial court to assign a mone-
tary value to a marital asset has significant implications for an eq-
uitable distribution award."9 8 The appellate court also noted that
the wife bore the burden of presenting evidence of the company's
91. Id.
92. Id. (alterations in original).
93. See id. at *16; cf. Shuler v. Shuler, No. 0082-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 243, at *5--
6 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) (unpublished decision) (explaining that the husband offered no
evidence as to the value of his own company, whereas the wife introduced credible evidence
and so the court accepted her proposed value).
94. Hassell, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 310, at *14-15.
95. Id. at *17.
96. Id. (alterations in original).
97. Id. at *14.
98. Id. at *16.
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value in order to be entitled to her marital share.9 9 Failure to es-
tablish the value of the company, the court observed, meant that
the property would need to be excluded from the equitable distri-
bution formula: "Thus, a finding that insufficient evidence of value
was presented regarding the value of Repton should result in no
equitable distribution award related to husband's interest in Rep-
ton."100
The appellate court concluded that the trial court's failure to find
the company's value and its decision to award $249,000 to the wife
in compensation for her interest in the company were "contradic-
tory and cannot be reconciled."10 1 This set of contradictory actions,
the appellate court determined, was an abuse of discretion.102 The
court consequently remanded the issue of valuation and distribu-
tion of the husband's interest.103
Finally, in Allen v. Allen, the question turned on whether pro-
ceeds from the sale of an application ("app") constituted marital
property when the sale was structured as compensation coming af-
ter the marriage.10 4 The couple married in 1999 and "[i]n late 2008
and early 2009, [the] husband developed the concept for ZipList, a
mobile application that allowed users to add recipe ingredients to
a shopping list."105 In 2009, he found investors and the following
year he launched the app.106 In 2012, he sold ZipList to Cond6 Nast
for upward of $12 million, and the parties entered into a Stock Pur-
chase Agreement ("SPA"). 10 7 Pursuant to the SPA, the husband
was to receive payments for the sale of his stock when the SPA was
signed in 2012 and subsequently on the anniversary of the signing
in 2013, 2014, and 2015.108 In addition, the husband signed a non-
compete agreement and became an employee of Cond6 Nast, for
which he was compensated separately from the stock sale.109
99. Id.
100. Id. at *16-17.
101. Id. at *19 ("Thus, the trial court erred either in concluding that the evidence did not
allow it to determine a value for Repton or in compensating wife for an asset it had concluded
could not be valued because of a lack of evidence.").
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. No. 0562-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 54, at *3, *6 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2017) (un-
published decision).
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *4, *9 (explaining that the agreed purchase price at the time of the sale was
set at $12,194,193.71).
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
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In 2013, the couple separated and soon after, the wife filed for
divorce.110 In 2016, the circuit court issued a ruling with respect to
property and declared that "all the property, including the ZipList
stock payments," were hybrid property.1 ' Based on this classifica-
tion, the court used a coverture fraction to determine the marital
share of the ZipList stock proceedS.112 On appeal the wife argued
that, despite the extended payments of the ZipList proceeds of sale
over several years, all proceeds were marital property because the
husband created ZipList and sold it during the marriage.113 The
husband argued that the hybrid classification was correct, because
the "portion earned during the marriage constituted marital prop-
erty and the portion earned post-separation constituted his sepa-
rate property."114
The appellate court agreed with the husband, affirming the trial
court's ruling." 5 The court found no error in the "threshold finding
that the SPA instituted a deferred compensation plan."116 In the
husband's favor, however, the court also affirmed that the deferred
payments from the stock sale derived from work performed by the
husband both during and after the marriage, and, therefore the
hybrid classification was correct."7
C. Spousal Support
In the spousal support arena, one case in particular stood out,
Ruane v. Ruane.118 The case is interesting because it addresses a
number of topics including the incorporation of separation agree-
ments, requests for determination of support, and pendente lite
support, and, of course, attorney's fees. The marriage between the
110. See id.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id. at *12 ('The numerator of the coverture fraction the circuit court applied was
comprised of the number of days from the date ZipList was founded to the date of the parties'
separation. The denominator of the coverture fraction was comprised of the number of days
from the date ZipList was founded to the date of the final payout. Based on that formula,
the circuit court determined the marital component of the deferred payments and held that
'about 73 percent of this asset is marital.'").
113. Id. at *6.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *14, *18.
116. Id. at *16.
117. Id. at *18.




two spouses was a long-term one, starting in 1987.119 The husband
had been in the United States Marine Corps and the wife had pri-
marily been a stay-at-home parent to their three children (who had
all reached majority age at the time of the divorce), but at the time
of the divorce was employed by a care facility for senior citizens.12 0
The couple first separated in March 2010, and signed a separa-
tion agreement.121 They reconciled briefly, but their reconciliation
ultimately failed and in December 2013, "the parties formed the
intention to remain permanently separated."122 After that, they
lived separate and apart without interruption.123 In March of the
following year, the "[w]ife filed for divorce on adultery grounds,"
and "[h]er complaint requested the incorporation of the terms of
the separation agreement into a final decree of divorce."124 She also
filed a motion for pendente lite relief and "asked the circuit court to
incorporate the terms of the separation agreement into any order
granting pendente lite relief."125
The "[h]usband argued that the separation agreement had been
abrogated by the [couple's] subsequent reconciliation."1 26 The cir-
cuit court, however, entered its order for pendente lite relief, incor-
porating the terms of the separation agreement.127 In December
2014, the husband filed his complaint for a no-fault divorce, "on the
grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart, without in-
terruption or cohabitation, for a period in excess of one year."128 In
his complaint, he requested equitable distribution of the marital
property and that the court "make an appropriate award of spousal
support."1 2 9 The circuit court granted the husband his divorce, de-
clining to incorporate the terms of the separation agreement after
concluding that the separation agreement had been "rendered un-
enforceable" by the reconciliation.1 3 0 Based on the husband's con-
duct leading up to the marital breakdown as well as his superior






125. Id. at *2-3.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id.
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income and earning capacity, the court ordered the husband to pay
his wife $4000 monthly in spousal support.13 1 The court also or-
dered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, totaling
$25,000, based on the wife's "good-faith pursuit of a divorce based
on adultery, the economic disparity of the parties, and [the] hus-
band's 'significant negative non-monetary contributions leading to
the dissolution of the marriage."'
132
Appealing the final divorce decree, the husband claimed, among
other things, that the trial court erred in awarding any spousal
support whatsoever.133 The husband argued that the wife had
never specifically asked for support-rather, her divorce petition
had asked for an incorporation of the separation agreement
terms.134 He also argued, alternatively, that the wife's failure to
prove her divorce on fault grounds meant that she had no valid
pleading for divorce upon which the circuit court could base its
award of spousal support to her.135 Responding to this claim, the
appellate court observed that the husband's complaint had made a
request for the court to determine issues regarding property and
support, specifically requesting that "the Court make an appropri-
ate award of spousal support."136 The court also noted that the hus-
band had testified to his willingness to pay spousal support at trial,
remarking, "My position on spousal support is I want to pay my
wife what she deserves, what is fair and right. We were married a
very, very long time. She followed me around the Marine Corps.
She sacrificed just like I did. I just want to pay what is fair."1 37 The
appellate court, consequently, concluded that the trial court had
not erred in awarding spousal support and that the amount
awarded did not constitute an abuse of discretion.138
Second, the husband argued that the first circuit court erred by
incorporating the 2010 separation agreement into the pendente lite
order.139 Here, he was on firmer ground. The appellate court agreed
131. Id. at * -5.
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id.
134. See id. at *56.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id. at *8.
137. Id. at *9.
138. Id. at *911.
139. Id. at *11.
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with the husband that the separation agreement was clearly un-
enforceable because the reconciliation had occurred prior to the
pendente lite award that incorporated the terms of the agree-
ment.140 Unfortunately for the wife, the trial court had relied solely
on the terms of the agreement and not heard any evidence about
the husband's ability to pay or the wife's need for spousal sup-
port.141 This, the appellate court concluded, was reversible error.142
The appellate court also concluded that the husband was entitled
to a $49,000 credit against future spousal support payments based
on the fourteen months of such overpayments made pursuant to
the pendente lite order.143 Making it even worse for the wife, the
trial court also "impermissibly" awarded the wife fifty percent of
her husband's military retirement pension by making the award
before the final divorce decree.144 The appellate court observed,
"The equitable distribution of such a marital asset cannot be made
prior to the entry of the final decree of divorce and a proper hearing
determining valuation of the asset."145 The wife, then, was also ob-
ligated to repay any and all payments made to her from this pen-
sion.
The awarding of attorney's fees was the only real way in which
the court could help the wife financially. Discussing attorney's fees,
the appellate court began by stating that while the husband had a
monthly income of $19,627.73, his wife's annual incGme was
$17,390.85.146 The wife had incurred $42,000 in attorney's fees and
the trial court had ordered the husband to pay $25,000 of that
amount.147 Referring again to the circumstances of the marital
breakdown and the husband's adultery (in addition to the income
disparity), the appellate court determined that there had been no
140. Id. at *11, *14.
141. Id. at *15.
142. Id. at *16.
143. Id. at *15-16. ("Husband now requests an award of $49,000 to remedy the circuit
court's error-'the difference between the pendente lite support payments ($7,500/month)
and the actual financial need established by both the Wife and eventually ordered by the
Trial Court ($4,000/month) for a total of $49,000 from March 2014 to May 2015
($3,500/month X 14 months)."').
144. Id. at *18.
145. Id. ("The circuit court's division of this largely marital asset also occurred without
first having an evidentiary hearing to determine what is the marital share of [the] husband's
military pension-and what share of the pension is his separate property.").
146. Id. at *20 (explaining that the circuit court also found that wife was not underem-
ployed).
147. Id. (ordering $25,000 "to be paid from the equity in the home and not until the home
is sold").
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abuse of discretion in the award.148 A small victory for the wife,
who was still obligated to pay $17,000 in attorney's fees and to re-
pay everything she had been awarded through the pendente lite
order. 149
D. Custody and Visitation
In the child custody arena, the most talked about case this last
year may have been Vechery v. Cottet-Moine, in which the judge's
order banned the child from playing competitive golf for a year.150
In that case, a 2014 custody and visitation order had the child's
mother and father share joint legal custody, although the mother
had "tie-breaking authority."15 1 Soon after, when the father moved
from Montgomery to Loudoun County, he filed a motion to amend
the order, and the Loudoun County Juvenile and Domestic Rela-
tions District Court awarded sole custody of the child to the
mother. 152 The father appealed to the circuit court; that court ruled
in May 2016, awarding sole legal and physical custody to the
mother and modifying the father's visitation.153 The circuit court
went further, however, and ruled that the father was not allowed
to attend the child's gymnastics practices and that the child was
not to play competitive golf for one year.154 The father, unsurpris-
ingly, appealed.
At the court of appeals, the judges considered these issues,
among others, and, finding no error, affirmed the circuit court.
With respect to attending gymnastic practice, the court of appeals
agreed with the circuit court that credible evidence tended to prove
that the father was a disruptive force at these practices.155 He
148. Id. at *20-21.
149. See id. at *18-19, *20, *21.
150. No. 1143-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 95, at *14 (Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2017) (unpublished
decision).
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *2, *3.
154. Id. at *7, *12-13 ("[The child] shall not be permitted to play competitive golf for one
year. Competitive golf is defined by the court as no tournaments and no lessons with any
golf pro with the exception of the Father. The Father and [the child] may play no more than
one (1) round of golf per week or five (5) hours with putting and practice whichever is
greater. When [the child] returns to Golf Tournaments the Father shall inform in advance
to the Mother of all tournament[s] the child is involved and signed up for with the location
day and time.") (alterations in original).
155. Id. at *7.
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would "show up at gymnastics practice, interrupt the class, and
pull the child out of practice. She would not return to the practice
until [the] mother told her to do so."156
Concerning participation in golf tournaments, the father argued
on appeal that there was no evidence to suggest hat a ban on com-
petitive golf was in the child's best interests.15 7 The appellate court
disagreed.15 8 Both parents had previously testified that the child
was a talented golfer and enjoyed the sport. 159 The father presented
evidence that she was "phenomenal" and had "the potential to def-
initely make it on the LPGA [tour]."160 In fact, prior to the first
hearing, the child participated in nineteen golf tournaments, and
the father-who was also her coach-was planning for her to play
in up to twenty-five golf tournaments in the upcoming year, some
of which involved missing school and travel.161
In addition, the father was disturbed by the mother's involve-
ment in the child's golfing. He complained about the mother taking
"the child to a different golf pro for a lesson because father believed
that the lesson negatively affected the child's swing."162 The father
was upset when the mother and child participated in a parent-child
golf event, emailing her to say that "he did not want the child to
play any competitive golf on mother's weekends without his ap-
proval."1 63 He also objected to the mother attending any of the
child's golf tournaments.164
The circuit court, assessing the evidence, found that the child
was "probably a very talented golfer."165 Nevertheless, the court
decided that the competitive golfing and the family stress around
golfing "affected the child's welfare."166 The court concluded, "It is
too much stress and I just think maybe if we take that out of the
equation, perhaps things will calm down a bit."167 This, the court
156. Id.
157. Id. at *11.
158. Id. at *14.
159. Id. at *11.





165. Id. at *13.
166. Id. at *14.
167. Id.
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of appeals concluded, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.168
Golfing, by this account, was definitely not in the best interest of
the child even though she excelled at it and may have enjoyed the
game.
Another case, Bedell v. Muller, addressed the issue of relocation
and turned on a father's request for the court to enjoin the mother
from moving.169 The parties in the case were married in 2005 and
resided in Fairfax County, where they had three children.170 After
eight years of marriage, the couple separated and agreed, as part
of their settlement, to share joint legal custody of the children.171
The mother was to have primary physical custody and the father
had visitation every other weekend and one evening each week for
dinner.172 The agreement stipulated that the children would re-
main enrolled in Catholic school, although the agreement did not
specify any particular school.173
Subsequent to the separation and agreement, the mother
wanted to move with the children to California in order to attend
graduate school to increase her earning potential.1 7 4 A judge denied
the mother's request to move, concluding that she failed to prove it
was in the best interest of the children. 175 Only nine days after this
ruling, the mother notified the father that she was planning in-
stead to move with the three children to Front Royal, Virginia,
where she had found a job as a teaching assistant.76 The father
filed a motion to enjoin this move, but while the motion was pend-
ing, the mother moved to Front Royal and enrolled the children in
the local Catholic Montessori school, where she had obtained her
job.177
The judge, after a hearing, denied the father's motion after find-
ing that the move-of sixty-four miles-was actually in the best
interests of the children.178 The judge remarked that the move to
168. Id.
169. No. 1618-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 294, at *1 (Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016) (unpublished
decision).
170. Id. at *2.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id. at *4-5.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *5.
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Front Royal would provide the mother with a stable income and
that the children would be attending the Catholic Montessori
where the mother would be working-an arrangement hat would
save on childcare expenses.179 This was important, because not
only did the mother have to leave the marital residence so that they
could sell it, but her spousal support was also scheduled to de-
crease significantly in 2016, from $4191 to $2500 per month.180
With the drop in support, the mother could no longer afford to con-
tinue living with the children in Great Falls or keep the children
enrolled in Catholic Montessori school in Fairfax County.181 This
drop in support, coupled with the need to find affordable housing,
constituted a material change in circumstances.
Adding to the best interests of the children analysis, the mother
also testified that she and the children had spent a lot of time in
Front Royal and knew some families there.182 Moreover, the chil-
dren would be able to "keep their animals" because they would be
moving to a detached home on an acre of land.183 With respect to
the relationship between the father and children, the judge con-
cluded that the distance would not "deprive the children of a rela-
tionship with the father" even though there was evidence that the
father's attendance at the children's events had been "sporadic at
best."184 The judge concluded that the mother was not purposefully
trying to keep the children from the father, especially since she
stated that "she was willing to drive the children to meet the father
for his midweek dinner visitation."18 5 For all these reasons, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision to deny the motion to enjoin
the move. California was too far for the court; Front Royal was just
right.
Finally, a third case, Coomer v. Commonwealth, took up the
question of felony child endangerment when the mother had been
drinking and then drove with her infant child in the car. 186 Coomer
went to a local pub with her fianc6 for "date night."187 At the pub,
179. Id.
180. Id. at *15-16.
181. Id. at *16.
182. Id. at *17.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *5-6, *19-20.
185. Id. at *20.
186. 67 Va. App. 537, 543, 797 S.E.2d 790 (2017).
187. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
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the couple had dinner and a pitcher of beer.188 After dinner, they
ordered a second pitcher of beer, planning to remain and play
games.189 Soon after they ordered the second pitcher, however,
Coomer received a phone call from her babysitter.190 The babysitter
was "having issues" with her boyfriend and was going to leave, so
Coomer arranged to meet the babysitter to pick up her twenty-two-
month-old daughter.191 Before leaving to pick up her daughter,
Coomer quit drinking, ate some French fries, and waited for ap-
proximately twenty minutes.192 Then, she drove to the meeting
spot and arrived without any problem.193 However, driving home
things did not go so smoothly. It was dark and raining, and the car
ahead of Coomer slowed down due to unevenness in the road due
to resurfacing.194
Coomer hit the bumper of the car in front of her, but both cars
were traveling under the speed limit on account of the bad weather
conditions.195 The police arrived when called by the other driver
and one officer later remarked that he detected "an odor of alcohol
about [Coomer's] person."196 When asked about her alcohol con-
sumption, Coomer told the officer that she had consumed approxi-
mately two beers two hours before the accident.197 The officer per-
formed several sobriety tests, which she failed-although the
officer stated, "I mean, it wasn't one of those where I had to, you
know, help support her."198 Coomer also took a breath test for blood
alcohol content, which was over the legal limit at 0.097; and, after
failing that test, she was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol.99 There was no accident report because there was no
damage to either vehicle and Coomer's daughter slept through the
entire incident.200
188. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
189. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
190. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
191. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
192. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
193. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
194. Id. at 541, 797 S.E.2d at 788-89.
195. Id. at 541, 797 S.E.2d at 788-89.
196. Id. at 541, 797 S.E.2d at 789.
197. Id. at 541, 797 S.E.2d at 789.
198. Id. at 541-42, 797 S.E.2d at 789.
199. Id. at 542, 797 S.E.2d at 789.
200. Id. at 542, 797 S.E.2d at 789.
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The trial court, reviewing the evidence, stated that, "Driving un-
der the influence has inherent dangers that are presented to eve-
ryone on the highways, and certainly all passengers in a vehicle
being operated by someone who's impaired by alcohol."201 The court
noted that there was an objective standard to determine criminal
negligence and that criminal negligence could be found to exist
when the defendant "either knew or should have known the prob-
able results of his [/her] acts."2 02 The trial court, however, concluded
that Coomer fit this description and convicted her of felony child
endangerment, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-371.1,
and sentenced her to three years of imprisonment, with all three
years suspended.203 Coomer was also placed on two years of super-
vised probation and one year of unsupervised probation.204
On appeal, Coomer argued that the trial court erred in finding
that she "committed a willful act or omission that was gross, wan-
ton, and culpable as to show a disregard for human life." 2 05 And the
court of appeals agreed.206 Analyzing the case, the court observed
that "the disposition of this case depends on whether the totality
of Coomer's actions leading up to the accident created a 'substan-
tial risk' or a 'probability' or the 'potential' of serious injury or
death to the child." 207 The answer was no.2 08 The appellate court
looked at Coomer's low driving speed on the "wet and curvy
road."209 The court also took into account the fact that neither car
sustained any damage and that there was no indication that
Coomer was driving in a way that was unsafe or unstable.210 There
was, the court noted, "nothing in Coomer's conduct other than the
consumption of alcohol that suggests any negligence on her
part."2 1 1 Her actions, therefore, did not rise to the requisite level of
culpability, and she did not show a gross or wanton disregard for
human life.
201. Id. at 543, 797 S.E.2d at 790.
202. Id. at 546, 797 S.E.2d at 791.
203. Id. at 544, 797 S.E.2d at 790.
204. Id. at 544, 797 S.E.2d at 790.
205. Id. at 540, 797 S.E.2d at 788.
206. Id. at 552, 797 S.E.2d at 794.
207. Id. at 547, 797 S.E.2d at 792.
208. See id. at 551, 797 S.E.2d at 794.
209. Id. at 547, 797 S.E.2d at 791-92.
210. Id. at 541, 550-51, 797 S.E.2d at 789, 793.
211. Id. at 550, 797 S.E.2d at 793.
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Without condoning driving under the influence, then, the court
recognized the difficulty of "[p]olicing the line between the ever
present 'possibility' of serious injury and the more concrete 'proba-
bility' or 'substantial risk' of serious injury or death."2 12 The second
pitcher of beer was probably not a good idea, even on date night,
but given her non-erratic behavior and the lack of any real harm
or injury, Coomer was not criminally negligent.
Drilling down, then, into questions about marriage and divorce,
equitable distribution and support, visitation and custody, the Vir-
ginia courts continued their work of refining the answers to legal
questions both new and recurring.
212. Id. at 551, 797 S.E.2d at 794.
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